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Rethinking Feminist Judgingt
MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE*
SUSAN E. WHEATLEY**
INTRODUCTION
For nearly two centuries no woman served on the United States Supreme
Court and very few served on either the lower federal courts or state courts.
Today, Sandra Day O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg are members of the
U.S. Supreme Court, and burgeoning numbers of female judges have joined
them on other federal and state courts.' Contributing to this change, the
Clinton administration is appointing unprecedented numbers of women to the
lower federal courts.2
The increasing number of female judges, not coincidentally, has been
accompanied by questions about whether female judges and female judging
are distinctive in some way, and by calls for further increasing the number of
female judges. Some writers assert that female judges approach cases and
make decisions in ways that their male colleagues are unable or unwilling to
do. According to these writers, most if not all female judges engage in
contextual analysis, consider a broad range of factors, and tie their decisions
less to arbitrary rules than to flexible standards.' Drawing on these empirical
t © 1995 by Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley. All Rights Reserved.
* Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. J.D., 1981,
Northwestern University; B.A., 1978, Wright State University.
** Partner, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio. J.D., 1986, Northwestern University;
B.A., 1982, Yale University. For their helpful comments on an earlier draft, we thank Jean Braucher,
Richard Myers, and Joseph Tomain, none of whom necessarily agrees with the views expressed here.
1. As of 1993, approximately 91 women were serving as federal district or appellate judges-
approximately 11% of the total number of federal judges. As of the same date, approximately 35 women
were serving on state supreme courts-approximately 10% of that total. MARY BECKER ET AL.,
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 893-94 (1994); see also Sheldon Goldman &
Matthew D. Saronson, Clinton 's Nontraditional Judges: Creating a More Representative Bench, 78
JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1994) (reporting that as of 1994, 14% of all federal judges were women).
2. In the first year of his administration, President Clinton nominated II females and 17 males to
federal judgeships. This percentage of women (nearly 40%) is far higher than the proportion appointed
by preceding administrations. Henry J. Reske, A Report Card on Clinton 's Judges, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1994,
at 16, 16; see also Goldman & Saronson, supra note 1, at 73; Carl Tobias, Keeping the Covenant on
the Federal Courts, 47 SMU L. REv. 1861, 1866 (1994); Paul M. Barrett, More Minorities, Women
Named to U.S. Courts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1993, at BI.
During the 1992 Presidential campaign, then-candidate Clinton called for more female judges to be
appointed, and added that "public confidence in our federal judiciary is furthered by the presence of
more women lawyers and minority lawyers on the bench, and the judicial system and the country benefit
from having judges who are excellent lawyers with diverse perspectives." Bush v. Clinton: The
Candidates on Legal Issues, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 57, 57. In contrast, then-President Bush defended
his record of appointing female federal judges, and added that the judiciary should be "open to qualified
candidates from all different backgrounds-regardless of race or gender." Id. Bush insisted that, under
his administration, he would make sure that "qualified women and minority candidates get fair
consideration for the bench." Id.
3. E.g., Sharon E. Rush, Feminist Judging: An Introductory Essay, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 609, 627-32 (1993). The leading work in this genre is Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986). In her article, however,
Professor Sherry does not appear to argue that most or all female judges decide cases in a distinctive
manner. See infra part I.B.
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assumptions, other writers take the next step by affirmatively calling for more
women to be appointed or elected to the bench. They argue that the allegedly
distinctive nature of female judging, coupled with the different life exper-
iences of women, will lead to improved judicial decision-making4 and to a
more diverse and representative judiciary.'
Most of these arguments appear, to date, virtually without critical comment.
There has been some effort to critique the first assumption-that most or all
female judges actually decide cases in a different manner from male judges.6
There has been little critical effort, however, to engage systematically the
normative call for more female judges.7 This Article will undertake to fill
these gaps. The general position is that both the empirical assumptions
underlying feminist judging and the call for more female judges are
problematic.
Part I summarizes feminist jurisprudence and the literature on feminist
judging." Parts II and III analyze the empirical and normative underpinnings,
respectively, of the call for more female judges. Part II first summarizes the
existing social science evidence testing the asserted differences between
female and male judges. It then reviews and compares the voting records and
opinions of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sandra Day O'Connor during
4. See Suzanna Sherry, The Gender of Judges, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 159, 161 (1986) ("[W]e can
expect that an influx of women into the judiciary will result in a corresponding decrease in gender-
biased decision making."); Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. CrN. L.
REV. 1237, 1243 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap] ("[N]umerous female judges
could beneficially affect substantive decisionmaking, especially in areas such as discrimination."); Carl
Tobias, More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477, 483-84 (1991) (asserting that the
differing backgrounds of female judges could improve the judicial system).
5. See Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 177 (1990)
("The appointment of more female judges could correspondingly help persuade fellow citizens of the
neutrality of the justice system."); Susan Moloney Smith, Comment, Diversifying the Judiciary: The
Influence of Gender and Race on Judging, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 179, 197 (1993) (arguing that the
attributes of female judges would improve the judicial system); cf A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking
Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The American Experience and the South African Challenge, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1028, 1034-35 (1993) ("An unrepresentative judiciary, however, affects both the public's perception
of the judiciary and the judiciary's perception of the public.").
Commentators in other countries have debated these issues as well. See, e.g., Scan Cooney, Gender
and Judicial Selection: Should There Be More Women on the Courts?, 19 MELBOURNE U. L. REv. 20
(1993).
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 407-08 (1990); sources discussed
infra part II.
7. E.g., Reske, supra note 2, at 16 (quoting Thomas Jipping of the Free Congress Foundation, who
argues that it is "inappropriate to either choose or evaluate the judiciary based on quotas. The only thing
some of these groups care about is race and gender."); Jeffrey Yacker, Overboard on Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, at E16 (arguing, in a letter to the editor, that it is "self-righteous, symbolic
political correctness" to insist that retiring Justice Harry Blackmun be replaced by a woman or a non-
white because society should "neither judge nor confuse the intellectual validity of political and
ideological ideas with the genetic backgrounds of those who marshal their cause").
8. We deliberately employ the word "feminist" rather than "feminine" in this regard. Most of the
literature on point agrees that the former term carries more ideological weight than the latter, and that
it assumes a political agenda with which not all women may agree. See Sherry, supra note 3, at 583
n.172. It is precisely the call for feminist judging, which we think fairly characterizes much of the
literature advocating more female judges, that bears the brunt of most of our criticism. Nonetheless, our
primary concern is with the call for more female judges, regardless of whether they purport to have a
"feminist" agenda. See infra part I.B.
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the Supreme Court's 1993 Term. Part II concludes with a review of the
literature on how female judges describe their own judicial role.
Part III presents a qualitative critique of the assertion that there should be
more female judges, concluding that the arguments advanced to support this
position are not well-founded. Putting aside assumptions of whether all or
most female judges do in fact act differently than their male counterparts (a
matter considered in Part II), the normative call fails for three reasons. First,
it incorrectly assumes that feminist jurisprudence possesses a coherent and
consistent core of principles which can aid or direct any judge in deciding a
broad range of particular cases. Second, the assumption that female judges can
(and should) decide cases in a feminist way collides with the still-viable
strands of legal thought which condemn stereotypes and demand impartial
judging. Third, the advocacy for female judges, standing alone, is inconsistent
with important aspects of democratic theory. Such advocacy assumes that
judges are representatives of a constituency, a concept of some controversy.
Even if the judicial representation model is accepted, in whole or in part,
feminist judges by definition do not represent one-half of the population. By
any measure, feminist judges fit very uneasily in most conceptions of the
proper role of the judicial system.9
Part IV presents several important caveats to this analysis. Specifically, this
Part explains that our views respecting feminist judges are not hostile to
supporting the development and application of a feminine, or feminist,
jurisprudence, or indeed to supporting a call for more female judges.
Establishing and meeting a goal of having more women on the bench is
justified to remedy the past discrimination against women in consideration for
judgeships, and to generally enrich the perspectives of the judiciary as a
whole. The Conclusion reiterates this latter position.
I. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE AND FEMINIST JUDGING
This Part briefly summarizes what most commentators consider to be the
current strands of feminist jurisprudential thought. It then turns in more detail
to the portion of that thought concerning female judges.
A. The Three Waves of Feminism and Feminist Jurisprudence
Feminist jurisprudence has received considerable continuing attention in
academic literature, and for our purposes only a skeletal outline is neces-
sary."0 The meaning of "feminism" itself is elusive. Katharine Bartlett has
defined feminism as "a self-consciously critical stance toward the existing
9. We confine ourselves to a critique of feminist judging, though we acknowledge that much of
our analysis might call into question similar assertions that there should be more judges of particular
racial, religious, and/or political subgroups. Our empirical and normative critique might play out
differently for other groups, and thus we hesitate to paint with broader brushes than those already used.
10. More in-depth discussions of this point can be found in two recently published casebooks. See
KATHARINE T. BARTLETr, GENDER AND LAW (1993); BECKER Er AL., supra note 1.
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order with respect to the various ways it affects different women 'as
women."'' More recently, Helen Haste has identified as a common charac-
teristic of all forms of feminism
the challenge of authentic self-definition. ... [T]he agenda is to claim an
authentic voice for women in their own destiny. Not only an authentic
voice, but an authentic view: to perceive the world through women's eyes
rather than holding a mirror up to men; to see the self as one experiences
it rather than as it is experienced through men's perceptions. 2
Although the specific content of "feminism" may differ, the basic point is that
women must self-consciously define themselves and their world.
Feminist jurisprudence, not surprisingly, confronts the same issues: Are men
and women different, and if so, what effect does, or should, that difference
have on the law? In general terms, three waves have characterized the
evolution of feminist jurisprudential thought. In the first wave, the primary
goal of feminist jurisprudence advocates was to equalize governmental
treatment of gender. The primary tool to achieve that goal was litigation. 3
The second wave, occurring in the 1980's, was heavily influenced by Carol
Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice. 14 This work focused more on the
discriminatory impact of even putatively gender-neutral practices. Gilligan's
work inspired a third wave of debate, continuing to the present day, between
advocates of equality and essentialness. That debate asks: To what extent are
feminist goals (whatever those might be) advanced or retarded by insisting on
legal equality, and to what extent are they advanced or retarded by recog-
nizing that, at least in some areas, women are different enough from men that
legal and policy recognition of the difference is necessary? 5 This third wave
of feminist thinking continues to struggle with the issue of whether men and
women are essentially different, and if so, how.' 6 The fundamental and
unresolvable issue of "difference" necessarily underlies all discussions of
feminist jurisprudence and judging.
B. Feminist Judging
In her scholarship, Professor Suzanna Sherry has set the framework for
discussion of the nature of judging by women. Her leading work is primarily
an analysis of the opinions of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. 7 In that essay,
11. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REV. 829, 833 (1990). For other
definitions, see Owen M. Fiss, What Is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 413-15 (1994); Martha
Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115, 115-16; and Wendy Kaminer, Feminism s
Identity Crisis, ATLANTIC, Oct. 1993, at 51, 51.
12. HELEN HASTE, THE SEXUAL METAPHOR 189 (1994).
13. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 21-24.
14. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
15. See generally BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 50-52; Gayle Binion, The Nature of Feminist
Jurisprudence, 77 JUDICATURE 140 (1993).
16. See Jane E. Larson, Third Wave-Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social Change in the
1990s?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1252 (1993).
17. See Sherry, supra note 3.
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Sherry argues that "modem men and women, in general, have distinctly
different perspectives on the world,"' 8 with the masculine perspective
embodied in pluralist liberal theory, and the feminine vision resembling
classical republican theory. 9 These differences, she contends, are empirically
grounded. Drawing heavily on the work of Carol Gilligan and others,20
Sherry suggests that "while women emphasize connection, subjectivity, and
responsibility, men emphasize autonomy, objectivity, and rights."'"
Likewise, Sherry argues, these differences (if they exist) would presumably
be reflected in a feminine jurisprudence by a female judge. Reviewing Justice
O'Connor's voting record and opinions from the time of her appointment to
the date of Sherry's writing (1981-1986), Sherry argues that her thesis is, on
the whole, borne out. In particular, she states that community values inform
Justice O'Connor's application of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment and that, accordingly, she has advanced a test which focuses on
whether the state endorsement of religion communicates a message that
nonbelievers are excluded from the polity.22 Similarly, in various discrimina-
tion cases, Justice O'Connor has emphasized the effect that the law being
challenged has on membership in the community.2 3 Sherry adds that it is
"not surprising" that Justice O'Connor has been particularly receptive to
claims of gender discrimination.24
According to Sherry, a community perspective helps to explain Justice
O'Connor's generally pro-prosecution perspective in criminal cases. In such
cases, Justice O'Connor emphasizes the state's interest in removing a threat
to the community.25 Accordingly, she emphasizes responsible decision-
making by the jury in a criminal case, and not simply the adjudication of the
criminal defendant's rights. One example of this point is Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Caldwell v. Mississippi,26 a case in which the majority
overturned a death sentence on the ground that the prosecutor impaired the
defendant's rights by informing the jury that any death sentence it imposed
would be reviewed on appeal. Justice O'Connor emphasized the way in which
the prosecutor's statement improperly "diminished the jury's sense of
18. Id. at 543.
19. Id. at 543-44.
20. Id. at 580-91. A good review of Gilligan's work, reactions to it, and subsequent research appears
in Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1547, 1550-54 (1993).
21. Sherry, supra note 3, at 582. Professor Sherry also spends considerable time linking feminine
aspirations with civic republicanism. Id. at 550-79. A critique of this linkage is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a useful analysis, see Judith A. Baer, Nasty Law or Nice Ladies? Jurisprudence, Feminism,
and Gender Difference, II WOMEN & POL. 1, 25-26 (1991). See generally Cynthia V. Ward, A Kinder,
Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
929 (1994) (discussing the differences and similarities between civic republicanism and feminist
arguments).
22. Sherry, supra note 3, at 593-95 (discussing, inter alia, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
23. Id. at 595-601.
24. Id. at 595.
25. Id. at 604.
26. 472 U.S. 320, 341 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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responsibility."27 In general, Sherry argues that Justice O'Connor favors
contextual standards rather than bright-line rules,2 8 a view that fits comfor-
tably within Sherry's notion of a feminine jurisprudence.
Overall, Sherry's article is descriptive. Indeed, she goes to great lengths to
downplay any prescriptive implications of her conclusions. Thus, she criticizes
the notion that one has to personally experience an aspect of law before
contributing to it,29 and she eschews the word "feminist." In her view, that
word carries with it a political agenda that may not be shared by all
women.3" With these caveats, Sherry seemingly diminishes her study's
implications for judicial selection, the primary focus of this Article. Indeed,
her remarks can be read as suggesting that there should not and need not be
a concerted effort to appoint mare female judges, since some male, and yet
not all female, jurists can employ feminine jurisprudence.
In this leading work, Sherry seems to carefully avoid a normative call for
the appointment of more women to the bench. Nevertheless, Professor Sherry
did take that prescriptive step in another, less-noticed article, The Gender of
Judges." In that article, Sherry offered three ways in which female judges
(or at least most female judges) differ from male judges (or at least most male
judges). First, the mere presence of female judges in the judicial system has
an educative function that should raise gender consciousness. Second, the
participation of female judges should create more sympathetic treatment of
gender issues. Third, female judges have a different perspective than male
jurists.32 The first two differences, she says, should eventually diminish as
gender discrimination erodes. The last difference, however, is not a product
of gender discrimination and therefore justifies the inclusion of more female
judges, even as (or if) gender discrimination withers.33
Though Sherry remains somewhat elusive on that final point, other writers
have explicitly called for more female judges. As previously noted,34 some
of these writers rely primarily on the disproportionately lower number of
women currently on the bench. Other writers take a harder line, arguing that
the notion of judicial independence and impartiality is culturally driven, and
that more female judges are needed to correct or compensate for the male bias
hidden in such notions." Similarly, still others argue that only female judges
can advance feminist aspirations, and that women should do so openly once
they become jurists. 36
27. Id. at 342.
28. Sherry, supra note 3, at 605-08.
29. Id. at 581 n.169.
30. Id. at 583 n.172.
31. Sherry, supra note 4, at 169.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 159, 169.
34. See sources cited supra notes 4-5.
35. E.g., Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges,
61 S. CAL. L. R~v. 1877 (1988).
36. E.g., Rush, supra note 3, at 621-29. For a futurist scenario in which female judges explicitly
advance feminist causes, see Green and Feminist Scenario, in ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE STATE
COURTS OF 2020, at 47, 48, 53 (James A. Dator & Sharon J. Rodgers eds., 1991).
[Vol. 70:891
1995] RETHINKING FEMINIST JUDGING
The post-Sherry scholarship thus embodies both empirical and normative
concepts, and they are difficult to disentangle. Once it is assumed that (most)
female judges act in ways different from (most) male judges, the implications
for the judicial selection process are difficult to escape-women should be
selected as judges because they are women. Likewise, a call for a gender-
sensitive judicial selection process invariably assumes that gender distinctions
exist among the behaviors of male, and female judges. The following Parts of
this Article consider these assumptions and conclusions.
II. EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES
The roles of women in our legal system have been subject to increasing
empirical scrutiny. Thus, the view that women bring a distinctive voice to
such tasks as lawyering," teaching law,3" and sitting as jurors,39 has been
explored elsewhere. This Part considers the distinctive role or roles that
women may play as judges.4"
A. Social Science Perspectives on Female Judges
The increasing number of female judges has elicited an increasing number
of studies by social scientists on the differences, if any, made by women
jurists. One recent summary of the research concludes that, on the whole, the
Sometimes one finds caveats to the bold calls for more feminist judging. E.g., Rush, supra note 3,
at 610 n.2 ("I do not mean to suggest that feminists have a lock on non-traditional legal decisionmaking,
that all women are feminist judges, or that only women can be feminists."). We find this statement to
be unconvincing, since the writer makes little effort to reconcile this self-imposed limitation with her
explicit advocacy of the need for more female judges. As we hope to demonstrate below, this limitation,
if taken seriously, considerably undermines the theory behind the call for more female, and feminist,
judges.
Louis Menand has made a similar point with regard to the possible contradictions in accentuating the
positive aspects of a diverse judiciary while ignoring the negative:
In this most inclusive sense, multiculturalism means something like the following: a
person's race, gender, or sexual orientation should be noticed when the difference noticing it
would make is a positive one, but it should not be noticed when the difference noticing it
would make is negative.
Many people feel, for example, that it is a good thing for one of the justices on the United
States Supreme Court (assuming he or she is qualified in every other respect) to be African
American, on grounds that an African American is likely, for obvious historical reasons, to
have a special perspective on constitutional issues, and it is important for that perspective to
be represented on the Court. But if someone were to refer negatively to an opinion written by
this justice as "an African-American perspective on the law," most people would consider the
remark offensive, since it would mean noticing race in a way that implies an accusation of
bias-even though "bias" was, in a sense, exactly what that justice was expected to contribute
to the Court's deliberations.
Louis Menand, The Culture Wars, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Oct. 6, 1994, at 16, 16 (reviewing RICHARD
BERNSTEIN, DICTATORSHIP OF VIRTUE: MULTICULTURALISM AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE
(1994)).
37. See BARTLEr, supra note 10, at 623-36; BECKER ET AL., supra note t, at 856-60.
38. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 828-41.
39. See BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 640-44.
40. Previous discussions of women as judges appear in BARTLETr, supra note 10, at 636-39, and
BECKER ET AL., supra note I, at 893-96.
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studies "offer little empirical support for the theory that women judges will
speak in a unique feminine voice."'" Our review of the research leads to the
same conclusion. In general, empirical studies show only slight, if any,
differences between the overall voting behavior of male and female judges
along the dimension of gender.
Studies from the 1970's and early 1980's support this conclusion. Studies
of the sentencing behavior of state trial judges," state supreme court
justices, 3 and appointees to the United States courts of appeals44 in gender
discrimination cases, show only slight differences between the decisions of
men and women on the bench. On the other hand, some studies of state
supreme court justices"5 and federal district judges4 6 seem to show,
respectively, that female judges tend to be more liberal than their male
counterparts, and that they tend to consider personal liberty and minority
policy cases differently.47 Even the latter study, however, found that gender
comparisons had little explanatory value for different voting behavior over a
broad range of cases, and the authors speculate that the judicial selection
process or the socialization experience of a legal education tended to weed out
those with nontraditional views of judging. 8
The most ambitious recent empirical studies were conducted by political
scientists Sue Davis, Susan Haire, and Donald R. Songer.49 Each hypothe-
sized that if Professor Sherry's characterization of Justice O'Connor's
jurisprudence were correct, and if it held true for all or most judges, then
those judges would vote differently than their male colleagues in at least three
areas. First, women would be more conservative in obscenity cases (as sexual
material oppresses women and damages the "moral fiber of the community").
Second, women jurists would be no more liberal or conservative than their
male colleagues in search and seizure cases (another assault against the
community). They would, however, be more liberal in employment discrimina-
tion cases (due to an emphasis on rights that are interdependent, such as full
41. Elaine Martin, Women on the Bench: A Different Voice?, 77 JUDICATURE 126, 128 (1993).
42. E.g., John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. J. POL. SC.
308, 320 (1981); Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex ofJudge
and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, Soc. Sc. J., Apr. 1977, at 77, 86.
43. E.g., Gerard S. Gryski et al., Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimina-
tion Cases, 48 J. POL. 143, 150 (1986).
44. E.g., Sue Davis, President Carter's Selection Reforms and Judicial Policymaking: A Voting
Analysis of the United States Courts of Appeals, 14 AM. POL. Q. 328, 335 (1986); Jon Gottschall,
Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 165, 171-72 (1983).
45. E.g., David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court Justices:
Are They Tokens or Outsiders?, 12 JUST. SYs. J. 232 (1987).
46. E.g., Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy
and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985).
47. Ironically, in Walker and Barrow's study, the male judges were found to be more liberal than
the females, contrary to expectations. Id. at 608-09.
48. Id. at 614-15. All of these studies were hampered by the relatively small number of women and
cases under study (a consequence, of course, of the relatively small number of women judges).
49. See Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the US. Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDICATURE 129 (1993); Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal
Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425 (1994).
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membership in the community)." To test these hypotheses, Davis, Haire, and
Songer examined a sample of published opinions from 1981 to 1990,
involving the twenty-two female judges who sat on the United States courts
of appeals during that period.5
The results of these studies supported only the last of the three hypotheses.
Contrary to the predictions of the researchers, the study revealed that the
gender of judges had no statistically significant explanatory value regarding
the judges' votes in obscenity and search and seizure cases. In contrast, other
factors such as the perceived ideology of the judge (operationalized by the
party of the President who appointed her) better predicted votes in these areas.
Only in the third area, employment discrimination cases, did the gender of the
judge appear to make a difference. 2 Interestingly, this difference was not
restricted to gender cases, but included all forms of discrimination. 3
The authors concluded that their studies provide only limited support for
extending the Sherry hypothesis outside the realm of employment discrimina-
tion. The authors further concluded that the failure of the studies to demon-
strate gender differences across subject areas might be explained by the
different voice hypothesis being "simply wrong-that women's purported
tendency to approach and resolve moral and legal problems differently from
men does not exist. '54 Instead, women judges might be more likely to favor
victims of discrimination because they have themselves been subject to gender
discrimination (or empathize more with those who have), rather than because
they employ a different mode of legal analysis.55 Yet another explanation is
that the statistical measures of voting behavior may not readily capture
different voice reasoning.
6
The study by Davis and her fellow researchers is not the last word, of
course. As more federal and state female judges sit for longer periods of time,
undoubtedly researchers will subject their work product to further statistical
scrutiny. At the present time, however, the literature does not support the
hypothesis that female judges systematically decide cases differently than their
male colleagues. 7 Rather, to the extent that there are systematic differences
50. Songer et al., supra note 49, at 429.
51. Davis et al., supra note 49, at 131; Songer et al., supra note 49, at 429-30.
52. Davis et al., supra note 49, at 132; Songer et al., supra note 49, at 432-36.
53. Songer et al., supra note 49, at 435-36.
54. Davis et al., supra note 49, at 133 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 133; Songer et al., supra note 49, at 437.
56. Davis et al., supra note 49, at 133.
57. We do not believe that another recent study by David Allen and Diane Wall contradicts our
conclusions. See David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, Role Orientations and Women State Supreme Court
Justices, 77 JUDICATURE 156 (1993). Allen and Wall studied the 59 women who served on 41 state
supreme courts between 1922 and 1992. Taking a sample of cases in which those women participated,
they sought to measure a different voice by examining dissenting behavior. Id. at 159-61. They found
that these dissents usually evinced a liberal or pro-woman position. Id. at 161-65. To their credit, the
authors acknowledge several limits on the inferences one can draw from their study. As they observe,
there are difficulties in using only dissenting opinions to study a different voice, and the political party
of the judges involved also plays a large role in explaining the results. Id. at 165.
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in voting behavior between male and female judges, other variables such as
political party affiliation play a much stronger role.
These conclusions are subject to some qualification. The empirical studies
analyze only the judges' votes and decisions. At the trial court level, which
absorbs vast numbers of judges, decision-making is only a part of what judges
do. Judges also manage cases, deadlines, and discovery disputes; assist or
exhort the parties to settle; and decide essentially unreviewable issues such
as entitlement to emergency relief and'matters of attorney conduct. Because
of the difficulty in measurement, very few empirical studies grapple with
these issues.5 8 Thus, the studies of voting behavior illuminate only one small
portion of what judges do. Perhaps further study would reveal subtle
differences between the way female and male judges discharge these less
visible duties. 9 If so, the empirical basis for the view that gender differences
exist would stand on firmer ground.
B. Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor in the 1993 Term
Professor Sherry contends that Justice O'Connor, to some extent, speaks in
a different judicial voice than her male colleagues on the Supreme Court.
Sherry especially notes the contrast between O'Connor's opinions in certain
cases and those of then-Justice William Rehnquist, her putative ideologically
conservative ally." Whether Sherry, then or now, properly characterizes
O'Connor's jurisprudence is a matter of some debate.6 1 To the extent that
empirical evidence can inform the debate, the weight of authority does not
support Sherry's position. One study by Sue Davis of Justice O'Connor's
votes from the 1981 Term through the 1991 Term concludes that "the findings
presented here do very little to support the assertion that O'Connor's decision
making is distinct by virtue of her gender." 62 While O'Connor is, overall,
somewhat more liberal than Rehnquist, the differences "may have simply been
due to ideological or legal factors unrelated to her sex. 63 Still another study
asserts that O'Connor does not represent most women's attitudes (as measured
by public opinion polls regarding specific issues) any more than her male
colleagues do. 4
58. See Herbert Jacob, Decision Making in Trial Courts, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 213 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (reviewing the empirical literature).
59. For one example of such a study, albeit one that does not focus on possible gender differences,
see Peter D. Blanck et al., The Measure of the Judge: An Empirically-Based Framework for Exploring
Trial Judges' Behavior, 75 IOWA L. REV. 653 (1990).
60. Sherry, supra note 3, at 592.
61. E.g., POSNER, supra note 6, at 407 n.23 ("With each year's batch of O'Connor's opinions, the
feminist interpretation of her judicial philosophy becomes less and less plausible.").
62. Sue Davis, The Voice of Sandra Day O'Connor, 77 JUDICATURE 134, 139 (1993).
63. Id.
64. Thomas R. Marshall, Symbolic Versus Policy Representation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 55,J.
POL. 140, 145-46 (1993); see also Thomas R. Marshall, Law, Public Opinion, and Gender Rights 8
(Apr. 1994) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, on file
with the Indiana Law Journal).
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Even if one acknowledges that Justice O'Connor does not consistently speak
in a different judicial voice, perhaps other female judges do. The presence of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the United States Supreme Court for the 1993
Term provides an excellent opportunity to revisit this issue. One of the
problems plaguing past empirical research is the difficulty in ascribing
difference to gender as opposed to other factors. Studying female judges who
sit on a multimember court mitigates this problem. In such a situation, the
judges all hear the same cases so one cannot attribute differences in voting to
such factors as disparate fact situations.65
For these reasons, we consider the voting and opinion-writing behavior of
Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg for the 1993 Term.66 Justice Ginsburg
largely lived up to the predictions that she would be a "centrist" Justice with
moderate, liberal leanings.67 While Justice Ginsburg voted with Justice
O'Connor in approximately seventy percent of the cases decided during the
Term,68 the two female Justices disagreed, in whole or in part, in a number
of the Term's significant decisions-including those involving aider and
abettor liability under the federal securities laws,69 the scope of bargaining
units subject to the National Labor Relations Act,70 the commercial speech
rights of certified public accountants,7 the ability of states to tax multi-
national enterprises,72 the reach of the Takings Clause,73 the limits on state
court awards of punitive damages,74 and the coverage of vote dilution claims
65. Walker & Barrow, supra note 46, at 600.
66. There is considerable literature evaluating the supposed "freshman effect" on the voting
behavior of Supreme Court Justices. The freshman effect hypothesizes that until new Justices are fully
acclimated to their position, they will defer to their colleagues. The evidence of such an effect is
decidedly mixed. See, e.g., Timothy M. Hagle, "Freshman Effects"for Supreme Court Justices, 37 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 1142 (1993) (providing possible explanations why some Justices experience freshman
effects while others do not); Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, The First-Term Performance of
Justice Clarence Thomas, 76 JUDICATURE 172, 173-77 (1993) (discussing the freshman effect and
assessing Justice Thomas' voting behavior against the common indicators used to gauge the effect). In
our view, Justice Ginsburg's first Term does not provide compelling evidence for or against the
"freshman effect." Cf Christopher E. Smith et al., The First-Term Performance of Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 78 JUDICATURE 74, 80 (1994) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg's assertiveness in writing
opinions and lack of any adjustment period indicate no freshman effect in her case).
67. See Jesse H. Choper, Benchmarks, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 78, 79-80; Transcript of President's
Announcement and Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at A24; see also Peter
Huber & Richard Taranto, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a Judge's Judge, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A18.
68. See The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 373 (1994)
(analyzing the Justices' voting behavior through a statistical table).
69. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., in majority; Ginsburg, J., joined dissent).
70. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778 (1994) (O'Connor, J., in
majority; Ginsburg, J., wrote dissenting opinion).
71. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., wrote majority opinion; O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., wrote majority
opinion; O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (O'Connor, J., in majority; Ginsburg, J., joined
dissent).
74. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994) (O'Connor, J., in majority; Ginsburg, J.,
wrote dissenting opinion).
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under the Voting Rights Act." In all of these cases, Justices O'Connor and
Ginsburg took what most would regard as the conservative and liberal
positions, respectively. Perhaps this superficially suggests that ideology, rather
than gender, motivates their decision-making.
Of particular interest are the cases involving what Sherry described as
feminine, communitarian interests. On that score, the evidence of whether
O'Connor and Ginsburg share a feminine jurisprudential vision is mixed. The
Term's only Establishment Clause case was Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet,76 in which a majority of the Justices found
that a public school district created especially for a particular religious group
violated the Clause. Justice Ginsburg silently joined Justice Souter's plurality
opinion, but Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment. In that opinion, O'Connor once again expressed
her dissatisfaction with the Court's three-part test for evaluating cases under
the Establishment Clause." Among other things, she argued that the test was
overly rigid and was not conducive to dealing with different facts raised by
the myriad of cases. 7' Reiterating her position (as noted by Sherry) that the
appropriate test is whether the government has made "'adherence to religion
relevant to a person's standing in the political community,' 79 she found that
the test had been violated since the law in question, "rather than being a
general accommodation, singles out a particular religious group for favorable
treatment."80 Justice Ginsburg joined a brief concurring opinion by Justice
Stevens, in which he argued that the state law established, "rather than merely
accommodat[ed], religion."'" From these opinions, it is difficult to determine
whether Justice Ginsburg disagrees with Justice O'Connor's position on the
Establishment Clause.82
75. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (O'Connor, J., joined plurality; Ginsburg, J., wrote
dissenting opinion).
76. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
77. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
78. Kiryas, 114 S. Ct. at 2499-500 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
79. Id. at 2497 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment)).
80. Id. at 2497-98.
81. Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82. At first blush, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion may seem fairly innocuous. However, he took
care to emphasize that, in his view, a religious sect was "segregating itself and preventing its children
from associating with their neighbors," which "unquestionably increased the likelihood that they would
remain within the fold, faithful adherents of their parents' religious faith." Id. These remarks seem to
be similar to Justice Stevens' prior views in Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases (as well as
substantive due process cases) in which he has argued that the state can only seek to enforce secular,
rather than religious, interests. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566-67
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally Richard S. Myers, The
Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 64-66 (1991) (discussing
cases in which Justice Stevens rejected various state interests as having a religious purpose and serving
no secular purpose). In contrast, Justice O'Connor appears to take a less hostile view of purportedly
nonsecular governmental purposes. See Kiryas, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
Establishment Clause does not demand hostility to religion, religious ideas, religious people, or religious
schools."); Myers, supra, at 41-42. If the approaches of Justices Stevens and O'Connor are distinct in
this regard, the joinder of Justice Ginsburg in the Stevens (but not the O'Connor) concurrence in Kiryas
suggests yet another divergence in O'Connor's and Ginsburg's jurisprudence.
[Vol. 70:891
RETHINKING FEMINIST JUDGING
Sherry also identified employment discrimination cases and those involving
gender as candidates for different treatment by female judges. In these
instances, the evidence of similar voices by O'Connor and Ginsburg is
equivocal. They were in agreement in cases of particular concern to women,
such as those involving the use of peremptory jury challenges solely on the
basis of gender,83 the application of civil RICO to pro-life demonstrators,"
and the First Amendment rights of pro-life protestors. 5 Likewise, O'Connor
authored the Court's opinion in the widely heralded Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.,86 in which the Court held that a Title VII plaintiff alleging
sexual harassment could make out a claim without evidence of concrete
psychological harm. Instead, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances to determine if there was an "abusive work environment."87
In a concurring opinion, Ginsburg expounded on these points, and recognized
that it remained an "open question" whether gender classifications are suspect
and thus subject to the strictest scrutiny under Equal Protection case law.88
But the voices of the two female Justices in these gender and discrimination
cases are not without nuances. In the peremptory challenge case, Ginsburg
silently concurred, but O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion arguing that the
result was not cost-free. She contended that the peremptory challenge
"remains an important litigator's tool and a fundamental part of the process
of selecting impartial juries," and that limits on its use gave her "pause."89
She added that "one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain
cases a person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his
or her view of the case,"9 ° and that in another case the person seeking to use
that intuition might be a "battered wife."'" This concurrence hardly seems
restricted to a communitarian perspective. Likewise, it is worth noting that
both Justices silently concurred in the majority opinion in Landgraf v. US1
Film Products,92 in which the Court held that certain provisions of the 1991
Civil Rights Act are not retroactive. This was a significant defeat for the civil
rights plaintiffs' bar, and one which is incongruent with the thesis that
feminist judges would favor discrimination plaintiffs.
One area of broad agreement between O'Connor and Ginsburg appears to
be statutory construction. Feminist theory generally eschews rules in favor of
standards,93 and it would seem to follow that feminists would favor a
flexible approach to statutory interpretation 94 rather than the strict textualism
83. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
84. See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
85. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
86. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
87. Id. at 370-71.
88. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372, 373 & n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
89. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1431 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 1432.
91. Id. at 1433.
92. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
93. See supra text accompanying note 28.
94. We stand by this statement, even though the renaissance of interest in statutory interpretation
during the 1980's and 1990's seems largely a male enterprise (see, for example, William Eskridge,
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followed by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.95 A review of the
opinions drafted by Justice Ginsburg indicates that she is comfortably in the
mainstream of the Court's statutory interpretation jurisprudence. 96 Her
position seems quite similar to that of Justice O'Connor.97
The 1993 Term's criminal law cases did not provide noteworthy opportuni-
ties to explore the influence of gender. There were several cases in whico
O'Connor diverged from Ginsburg's position in favor of the defendant,9" but
no great jurisprudential divide was revealed. Of greater interest was the
Court's revisiting of the Caldwell case, described above. 99 In Romano v.
Oklahoma,' the majority found that the Caldwell holding was not violated
in a capital case in which the jury was told (contrary to state law) that the
defendant had been sentenced to death in another case. Relying in part on
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Caldwell, the majority stated that
the "jury was not affirmatively misled regarding its role in the sentencing
process.'' Concurring in Romano, O'Connor further distinguished her
Caldwell views by observing that the prosecutor's statement was permissible
because the information given to the jury was accurate, even though it may
have lessened the jury's sense of responsibility.0 2 Justice Ginsburg authored
a dissenting opinion joined by three other Justices, in which she found no
Phillip Frickey, Richard Posner, etc.). We are unaware of any broad review of this topic from a feminist
perspective. Compare Bartlett, supra note 11 (arguing for feminist legal methods as a means of
achieving substantive feminist goals); and Peggy C. Davis, ContextualLegal Criticism: A Demonstration
Exploring Hierarchy and "Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1635 (1991) (arguing that the
"feminine" voice can aid the legal representation process by allowing communication to remain tentative
and exploratory) with Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22, 66-69 (1992) (positing that standards-based decision-
making better facilitates equality, the common good, and communication about why decisions come out
in a particular way).
95. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning ": Justice Scalia 's Jurisprudence ofStrict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401,401 (1994) (contending that only Justices Thomas and Kennedy follow Justice
Scalia's approach).
96. See Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2624 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); United States v.
Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust &
Say. Bank, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.); see also Ratzlaffv. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 662
& n.18 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (invoking the canon of'construction that a resort to legislative history is
improper when statutory text is clear).
97. For both Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor, the secondary citation of choice in statutory
construction cases was Clark C. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE LJ.
1561 (1994) (book review). See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich
Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251, 2255 (1994) (O'Connor, J.); Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1806
(1994) (Ginsburg, O'Connor, JJ., concurring); Granderson, 114 S. Ct. at 1267 n.10 (Ginsburg, J.).
98. E.g., McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., in majority; O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., in majority; Ginsburg, J., wrote dissenting opinion); Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 655 (Ginsburg, J., wrote
majority opinion; O'Connor, J., joined dissent); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114
S. Ct. 492 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., in majority; O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
100. 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994).
101. Id. at 2010.
102. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2013 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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meaningful distinctions from Caldwell. °3 Caldwell, then, does not seem to
provide a vehicle to explore feminist criminal procedure.
To be sure, one must be cautious about drawing inferences about the
comparative performance of any two Justices from just one Term of the Court.
From this limited data, however, one can conclude that while there appear to
Ise broad areas of agreement between Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg, the
amount of divergence calls into question the notion of a feminist (or feminine)
style of judging which would encompass all female jurists.
C. Female Judges on Judging
Another source of information regarding the behavior ofjudges is the jurists
themselves. Writing by judges about the art of judging has a rich history in
American legal literature,"°4 and more recently female judges have contri-
buted to the lore. If Sherry's thesis is correct, one might expect a defense of,
or at least a description of, some form of feminist judging from women on the
bench. In our view, the writing of women jurists does not meet this expecta-
tion. Rather, in virtually all instances female judges describe their roles in the
traditional framework utilized by male jurists. I"5
Several examples demonstrate this point. To begin, Justice O'Connor seems
uncomfortable with Professor Sherry's description of her work.0 6 O'Connor
argues that such "gender differences currently cited are surprisingly similar
to stereotypes from years past."'0 7 To the extent that such differences really
exist, O'Connor concludes that "the different voices will teach each
other."'0 8 In the same vein, at the ceremony during which President Clinton
announced her nomination, then-Judge Ginsburg remarked on "the work of a
good judge."'0 9 Invoking traditional icons such as Justice Holmes, as well
as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, she opined that "a judge is
bound to decide each case fairly in a court with the relevant facts and the
applicable law even when the decision is not, as [Rehnquist] put it, what the
home crowd wants."" 0 Other female judges have been even more blunt in
forgoing a feminist judging model."'
103. Id. at 2013-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); FRANK M.
COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE (1980); POSNER, supra note 6.
105. A good example of the literature (revisiting the writings of Cardozo), with citations to the
writings of female judges, is Shirley S. Abrahamson, Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 965 (1993).
106. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Progress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1553 (1991) ("One
author has even concluded that my opinions differ in a peculiarly feminine way from those of my
colleagues.") (footnote omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1557.
109. Transcript ofPresident's Announcement and Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, supra note 67, at A24.
110. Id.; see also Ruth B. Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185, 1188-98
(1992) (discussing collegial judging).
I 11. See, e.g., Miriam G. Cedarbaum, Women on the Federal Bench, 73 B.U. L. REv. 39, 44 (1993)
(federal district judge stating that gender plays no role in a particular judge's decisions); Mark Curriden,
A Jurist of First Impression, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at I (quoting a state supreme court justice as
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These seemingly gender-neutral descriptions of judging might be dismissed
on a number of grounds. Many of these female judges are older and may have
received little, if any, formal exposure to modem feminist thinking, and such
thinking has perhaps been expunged in the judicial selection and socialization
process."' Female judges drawn from the more modem generation of female
law students and lawyers may express different views. And perhaps these
writers, consciously or not, were not truthfully describing their actual thought
processes when they render decisions." 3 It is possible that they either did
not fully appreciate their own judicial philosophy, or were dissembling for the
benefit of the audience.
We, however, are willing to take these writers at their word. Accordingly,
there seems to be no great rush among those women who are judges to
embrace feminist judging. Instead, the role they subscribe to seems to be the
traditional one of a neutral, impartial decision-maker. To the extent that such
a role is possible, perhaps these judges feel that it is a desirable and proper
model, a matter the next Part of this Article explores.
From a variety of sources-statistical compilations of voting, comparisons
of the opinions of two female Justices on the same Court, and descriptions of
the judicial role-the empirical evidence does not support the assumption that
women decide cases differently from men. This is not to say that Sherry's
thesis is wrong or without value. Surely, with some judges in certain types of
cases, it is analytically helpful to describe or justify decisions as an example
of feminine judging. By the same token, the evidence, considered over many
jurists and over a broad range of cases (complemented by their own writings
on the subject), demonstrates that most female judges, in most cases, render
decisions in ways that are not distinctive to their gender. If that is true, it
considerably undermines the empirical grounding of the call for more women
judges.
III. NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES
The empirical evidence outlined above does not demonstrate that most or
all women judges do, or will, render decisions in a distinctively feminine or
feminist manner. Nonetheless, it is possible that women judges do render
decisions or conduct their court's business in a manner that is different from
male judges, even though that has not been empirically established. On the
saying, "I do not want to be known as the black judge or the woman judge, but a fair and hard-working
judge."); Different Voices, Different Choices? The Impact of More Women Lawyers and Judges on the
Justice System, 74 JUDICATURE 138, 145 (1990) (female federal district judge remarking, "Do women
look at fairness and justice differently? I don't think so.").
112. See Davis, supra note 49, at 133. Justice Ginsburg is a notable exception to this generalization.
See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 27, 30 (describing Ginsburg's role as an ACLU attorney
challenging sex discrimination in the 1970's).
113. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1990); David L. Shapiro, In Defense
of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory
Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353 (1989).
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assumption that this might be the case, this Part considers the troubling
normative implications raised by this prospect.
A. Coherence and the Feminist Model of Judging
Those advocating more female judges appear to assume that there is a stable
body of feminist theory upon which such judges can and should draw. The
assumption of advocates of gender-sensitive judicial selection-while rarely
expressly articulated-is that feminist jurisprudence has clearly defined
principles which a female judge can use to help her make decisions. If a judge
can turn to a coherent version of feminism, that version will be a resource for,
and perhaps a check upon, her conduct. The problem is that there is currently
no such coherent version to justify the calls for more female judges.
To their credit, feminist legal theorists have not been shy about the internal
divisions within feminist jurisprudence. To cite a few examples, some
feminists argue for women's reproductive rights, while others suggest that a
communitarian vision would permit the state to regulate abortions, at least to
some degree." 4 Some feminists argue that the government can and should
regulate pornography, since it subjugates women and leads to violence against
them, while others argue that First Amendment rights should control."5
Some feminists argue that alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") better serves
women's abilities and interests rather than the zero-sum game of formal
litigation, while others argue that women's rights are better protected by
litigation because women often occupy weaker bargaining positions and thus
may stand to lose in ADR." 6 Undoubtedly, other issues could be mentioned.
We do not wish to belabor the point, much less take a position on these
controversies, but only wish to observe that a putatively feminist judge will
receive ambiguous signals from her jurisprudence.
Putting such disputes to one side, it is still not clear how feminist theory
will help judges make decisions in actual cases, apart from other legal tools
already available to them. Professor Harold Koh has suggested that feminist
theory supplies a powerful cognitive and critical dimension that is absent or
undeveloped in much formal jurisprudential theory." 7 Nonetheless, he
contends that feminist theory has a limited constructive dimension. Thus, he
asks: How do feminist legal concepts "meaningfully affect the day-to-day
operation of, say, Rule 11 or a § 1404 transfer or a § 1292 interlocutory
appeal?""'
114. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 408-14; see also Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In
a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U.
L. REv. 858 (1993).
115. See BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 578-87; BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 313-52; Nadine
Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1993);
Joan Kennedy Taylor, Does Sexual Speech Harm Women? The Split Within Feminism, 5 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 49 (1994).
116. E.g., BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 535-38; BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 856-67.
117. Harold H. Koh, Two Cheers for Feminist Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1993).
118. Id. at 1205.
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Drawing attention to these apparent inconsistencies on policy and the
seeming lack of formal constructs might prove too much. Any legal theory is
subject to some criticism of internal division and lack of practical application
across *many cases." 9 On the other hand, Koh can be answered. For
example, consider Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (and its state counter-
parts), which sanctions frivolous conduct by attorneys.20 In ruling on such
a motion, a female jurist informed by feminist theory might well ask questions
left out by traditional legal thought, such as those concerning the gender
implications of the case, the resources available to the parties and their
respective attorneys, whether one attorney was, purposefully or not, pushing
the legal or factual envelope in the case, whether such actions should be
encouraged, even if they did not create an actionable claim in the case at
hand, and other issues concerning the real world of litigation.' But
feminist theory would not be particularly distinctive in asking many of these
questions, as law and economics, critical legal studies, metaprocedure, and
other schools of thought would ask similar questions.'
This is not to say that feminist theory cannot speak specifically to
procedural2 3 or other issues seemingly free of gender implications. Nor
does this Article suggest that there is not common ground among feminists of
all stripes, or even that the value of consistency cannot itself be ques-
tioned. 4 But as of now, feminist legal theory is not sufficiently developed,
consistent, or coherent to act as a resource for, or a check upon, a woman
selected as a judge.
B. Feminist Judging, Classical Judging, and Stereotypes
Advocates for increasing the number of women on the bench seem to fall
into two categories which, thus far, this Article has treated together. One
school takes the hard line that female jurists should explicitly advance a
feminist agenda of, among other things, suppressing pornography 2 ' or
119. Minow, supra note 11, at 134 n.63.
120. It is an understatement to observe that the 1983 revision t& Rule 11 has generated enormous
controversy and criticism, mostly from the plaintiffs' bar, which in part led to a revision to the Rule in
1993. For a brief overview of the enormous literature on these issues, see Carl Tobias, Congress and
the 1993 Civil Rules Proposals, 148 F.R.D. 383 (1993).
121. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 11, at 836-67 (identifying legal methods distinctive to feminism:
(1) asking the "women question" (that is, have gender issues been left out of consideration); (2) feminist
practical reasoning; and (3) consciousness raising).
122. See Koh, supra note 117, at 1205-06; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE
L.J. 945 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988)).
123. See Symposium, Feminist Jurisprudence and Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1139 (1993).
124. Minow, supra note 11, at 134-38; cf Koh, supra note 117, at 1206-07 ("In raising all of these
concerns, I am acutely aware that I could be accused first, of asking that feminist procedure be delivered
up in a nicely wrapped box, and second, that I may be engaging in traditional male criticisms:
formalistically demanding that values be operationalized into rules or that all internal inconsistencies
of an emerging theory be eliminated.").
125. See, e.g., Rush, supra note 3, at 614-27.
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upholding abortion rights. 2 6 These results are quite consistent with the goals
usually attributed to the feminist agenda. 127 The other, more populous,
school takes a softer line, apparently not calling for female judges to advance
a specific agenda but arguing that they can and should bring a different form
of legal reasoning to bear on legal controversies. 21 While the second school
is far more palatable to the Authors, ultimately both are flawed: the first
school c!ashes with the long-standing goal of impartial judging, while the
second is based on the stereotypical assumption that only women can engage
in feminist jurisprudence.
In the classical model of judging, jurists are neutral, impartial decision-
makers. They render decisions by laying aside their personal and policy
preferences and objectively applying legal principles to the facts of a
particular case. This process will lead to a result which the judge applies no
matter what she or he thinks of the result, of the law that required it, or of the
anticipated reaction. This model has long-standing roots in our legal
culture 129 and is reflected in the Code of Judicial Conduct, 3 ' among other
things.
Many skeptics, particularly among academics, find this model to be quaint
and ludicrous. For some, the notion of women jurists aggressively and openly
pursuing a feminist agenda is apparently not beyond the pale.13 ' The model
of an impartial judiciary remains potent, however. According to the Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause requires an impartial tribunal,'32 and the
Court has taken pains to emphasize that its legitimacy is grounded in the law,
not in the Justices' policy preferences or in response to political pres-
sures.' Judges themselves frequently state that they address most cases and
issues in a principled manner, and argue that the notion of a politicized
American judiciary is vastly overstated.'34 Indeed, even cynical academics
126. See, e.g., Id. at 627-28.
127. E.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1181, 1191-1208 (1994)
(acknowledging that not all feminists, much less all women, would agree on one agenda, but nonetheless
listing on the feminist agenda the following items: physical security, equal employment and education
opportunities, family structures and welfare policies, reproductive freedom, and increased political
representation).
128. See supra notes 4-5 and sources cited therein.
129. POSNER, supra note 6, at 4-23.
130. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1, 3 (1990).
13 1. Cf BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 640 (suggesting that one reading of Resnik's article is that
"more female judges will make a difference [perhaps) because female judges will be biased in favor of
women') (emphasis in original); Resnik, supra note 35 (criticizing assumptions of impartiality). For
further discussion of putatively impartial judging and its critics, see infra part IV.
132. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 761 (1994); cf. Liteky v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 1147, 1158 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("One of the very objects of Law is the impartiality
of its judges in fact and appearance").
133. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814-16 (1992) (plurality opinion).
134. See David M. Ebel, So-What's Your Judicial Philosophy?, 20 LITIGATION, Fall 1993, at 3;
Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decision Making, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 837; Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 37 J. LEGAL ED. 307 (1987); Myron H. Bright, Getting There: Do Philosophy and Oral
Argument Influence Decisions?, 77 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1991, at 68; cf. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127,
1127 (1994) (mem.) (Scalia, J., concurring) (reasoning that the constitutionality of the death penalty
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labor to create jurisprudential theories "to supply a new foundation for the
favored decisions of the Court that will provide a more plausible basis for
concluding that they are grounded in law, rightly understood." 135
These sentiments are not confined to the legal community. There is consi-
derable social science evidence suggesting that ordinary citizens expect and
desire the legal system to utilize adversarial procedures with neutral decision-
makers. 13 6 Likewise, recent opinion polls support the Court's assumption
that its public legitimacy is premised on its putatively principled decision-
making. 37 And perhaps most pertinent for the matter at hand, a recent study
found a preference for procedural fairness cutting across gender lines.
31
While this Article is not oblivious to the fact that the real world makes
classical judging an aspiration but- not always a reality, 39 that model should
remain a goal. Perhaps in agreement, the second, softer school of gender-
sensitive judicial selection does not call for partial judging. Rather, it holds
that female judges can uniquely bring to bear the useful tools of compassion,
preference for standards over rules, and a general understanding of gender
issues. The problem with this school is the assumption that women, and only
women, can possess or utilize these techniques. To the contrary, not all
female judges engage in feminist theory; moreover, some male judges utilize
the techniques often thought to be the province of female judges. The second
school's assumption, then, is based on a stereotype.
Like judicial partiality, drawing lines based on stereotypical assumptions of
human behavior has long been disfavored in the law. With regard to gender,
the Court's equal protection jurisprudence stands as a good reference for this
disfavor. 4 To the extent that feminist legal techniques can be uniquely
operationalized, it seems doubtful that all female judges utilize them (or, for
that matter, advance a feminist agenda). 4' Likewise, male judges can and
do apply feminist jurisprudential principles. Sue Davis compared the opinion-
writing behavior of female judges on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to
should be determined by constitutional text and not by the personal views of the Justices), denying cert.
to 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993); Marcia Coyle, Breyer Charts Moderate Course to High Court, NAT'L
L.J., July 25, 1994, at All (reporting that during the discussion of capital punishment at his
confirmation hearings, Judge Stephen Breyer stated that if a judge has personal views that run contrary
to prevailing law, recusal is appropriate).
135. Thomas W. Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137,
138 (1994).
136. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 103 (1988).
137. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court,
36 AM. J. POL. SC. 635 (1992); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment
of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J.
703 (1994).
138. E. Allan Lind et al ... And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute
Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1994).
139. See infra part IV.
140. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
141. Cf Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter
Administrations, 71 JUDICATURE 136, 141-42 (1987) (suggesting that female judicial appointees of
President Reagan are more conservative than those of President Carter).
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that of male jurists on the same court with similar background characteris-
tics.'42 Davis, like Sherry, focused on cases that raised equal protection,
employment discrimination, and other issues that could potentially demon-
strate a different judicial voice. 14 ' The potential was not realized. She
concluded:
Do women judges speak in a different voice? Sometimes, some female
judges do. But sometimes, some men judges also speak in that different
voice. The results presented there do not provide empirical support for the
theory that the presence of women judges will transform the very nature of
the law. 4
4
Thus, the voices of female and male judges cannot be neatly categorized. In
the words of Richard Posner, "for every Rehnquist [there is] a Brennan,"'145
or, one should add, for every Edith Jones 146 there is a Lewis Powell147 or
a Harry Blackmun.
48
Two other claims might be advanced to further qualify the second school
as advocating for more female judges. The first argument is that not all
female judges (or no male ones) will engage in feminist analysis. Rather,
female judges are only more likely to utilize feminist methodology than their
male counterparts. 49 The second argument is that consciously or not, few
female judges will explicitly advance a feminist agenda. Instead, the likely
impact made by female judges will be on the margins. More specifically, in
deciding fact-sensitive legal issues, female judges may be more likely to
inform their exercise of discretion by feminist methodology. This may be
especially true at the trial level, where judges typically engage less in law
development (as opposed to the approach taken by their appellate counter-
parts) and more on the application of settled legal principles to disparate fact
situations.'50
These caveats seem to soften the position of partial, feminist judging with
which this Article takes issue. Taken as such, these positions are examples of
stereotypical thinking. Even if "most" members of a certain group are said to
engage in a common type of conduct, that still leaves a greater or lesser
number of that group who do not engage in the specified conduct. Such broad
generalizations hardly seem a firm basis upon which to baldly call for more
142. Sue Davis, Do Women Judges Speak "In a Different Voice?" Carol Gilligan, Feminist Legal
Theory, and the Ninth Circuit, 8 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 143 (1992-1993).
143. Id. at 148-52, 154-57 (describing the study's methodology).
144. Id. at 171,
145. POSNER, supra note 6, at 407.
146. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 179-80 (discussing the alleged lack of sympathy expressed by
United States Fifth Circuit Judge Edith Jones for the defendant in a death penalty case).
147. See JOHN C. JEFFRES, JR., JUSTICE LEWiS F. POWELL, JR. 42-43 (1994) (describing the flexible,
balancing approach found in much of Justice Powell's jurisprudence).
148. See Richard C. Reuben, Justice Defined, 80 A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 46, 48-50 (describing the
compassion expressed in much of Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence).
149. See sources cited supra note 36.
150. See BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 640 (suggesting that contextualization, under a feminist theory,
would mean that a judge would, among other things, "pay more deliberate attention" to the facts and
the relationships among the parties).
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women jurists. On a related note, the asserted marginal impact of feminist
judging is largely based on the assumption that women-not men-engage in
contextual analysis. Such analysis may well be a good thing on its own terms,
but there is no good reason to assume that male judges cannot utilize it as
well.
C. Feminist Judging and Representation
As this Article has observed, a number of writers have argued that more
women jurists are needed to ensure a judiciary that is more representative of
the populace.' 51 These arguments seem analytically similar to those outlined
above. Representation arguments assert .that the present, male-dominated
judiciary must be failing to advance the concerns of most women, for if these
concerns were being advanced, presumably there would be less (or no) need
for more equitable representation.'5 2 Nonetheless, restating the issue in
terms of democratic theory sheds light on the issue, and asks whether judges
are, or should be, representatives of the populace.
A powerful source for the notion that judges are representatives is the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisom v. Roemer.153 In that case, the majority
held that the Voting Rights Act applied to a state's judicial elections. In the
course of the opinion, the Court considered the coverage of the phrase, "to
elect representatives of their choice," as used in the Act.'54 The majority
acknowledged that "'judges need not be elected at all,"' and that, "ideally
public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the judge is
often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment."' 5
Nonetheless, the majority held that such judges are statutory "representatives,"
since they have "prevailed in a popular election."' 5 6 Indeed, the majority
emphasized that the "fundamental tension between the ideal character of the
judicial office and the real world of electoral politics" will not be resolved by
simultaneously electing judges while claiming that they are indifferent to the
popular will.
57
151. See sources cited supra note 5. Some commentators have argued that a diverse judiciary can
be attained (including the addition of more female judges) without sacrificing the quality of the
individuals appointed. See BARBARA A. PERRY, A "REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME COURT?. THE IMPACT
OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS 136 (1991); Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap,
supra note 4, at 1244. This Article does not dispute that the goals of diversity and quality are
compatible; rather, it supports the second goal, but finds the first to be an inappropriate one-one that
should not be attained by the implicit use of quotas to hurriedly increase the number of women jurists.
152. It might be argued that representation also includes the goals of education and having women
as role models. See Sherry, supra note 4, at 159-63; see also supra text accompanying notes 32-33;
infra part IV.
153. 501 U.S. 380 (1991); cf. Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines:
Formalism, Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 419, 439 (1992)
(arguing that the outcome in Chisom was a referendum on legal realism).
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
155. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400 (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v.
Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 622 (1990)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the "ordinary meaning" of the term
"representatives" does not include judges. 5 Scalia asserted that while the
judges in question were elected, they did not purport to act on behalf of the
populace. 59 According to Scalia, "the judge represents the Law."'60 We
feel that Justice Scalia got the better of the argument (as our defense of the
classical model of judging should indicate), but it is unnecessary here to
refight Chisom. Even accepting the jurisprudential authority of the majority
decision, it does not provide a weighty argument for the proposition that
judges are representatives. First, it does not speak to the characterization of
federal judges. As the Chisom Court itself observed, federal judges were
granted the protection of life tenure precisely to shelter them from public
opinion'
61
Second, Chisom says little about those state court judges who are not
elected. Approximately a dozen states select judges without any sort of
election. Of the others, about a dozen have some version of merit selection
coupled with retention elections. The remainder select most or all of their
judges through partisan or putatively nonpartisan elections. 62 Those states
that, like the federal system, do not utilize judicial elections appear to fall
outside the representation model.
Finally, even those states that do elect judges fall uneasily within such a
model. Some have argued that those states, by utilizing elections, forgo any
claim that their judges are unlike other elected officials. 163 But the mere
presence of such elections does not bear the historical weight placed on them
by key critics. Most judicial elections can be traced to the spasm of populism
which occurred during the Jacksonian Era, 64 but the trend since that time
has been to abandon the election process. 65 Furthermore, modem judicial
election campaigns are hardly models of representative democracy. Almost
without exception, such elections have exhibited a high percentage of
uncontested races, or contested races virtually devoid of meaningful debate.
Voters have been found to possess low levels of information about judicial
158. Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 411.
161. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400.
162. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 227-35 (1992-93 ed.)
(collecting information on judicial selection techniques for each state); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review
of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1589-90 (1990) (providing information on each state's judicial
selection procedures); Kurt E. Scheuerman, Comment, Rethinking Judicial Elections, 72 OR. L. REv.
459, 459-63 (1993) (discussing the various methods ofjudicial selection employed by the states). It is
difficult to be more specific about the actual numbers of states employing each of the various selection
procedures, since some states have various forms of selection/election for only some, but not all, judges.
Furthermore, there is a lack of uniformity between states.
163. See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 401; Frederick G. Slabach, Equal Justice: Applying the Voting Rights
Act to Judicial Election, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 823, 869-71 (1994).
164. Slabach, supra note 163, at 836-37; Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges-An Historical
Introduction, 44 TEx. L. REv. 1081 (1966).
165. Scheuerman, supra note 162, at 466.
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candidates or the positions they take on various issues. 16 6 Given current
ethical limitations on what judicial candidates' themselves can say about
issues,'67 the low visibility of the candidates among the electorate is not
surprising. Many judicial races degenerate into little more than partisan
politics, name recognition, and incumbency advantage.'68
Indeed, some might find the dismal lack of substantive debate in judicial
elections to be desirable since it insulates judges from political pressures more
appropriate for other branches of government. But the notion that any branch
of government, even the judiciary, is unaccountable in some way to the people
it serves is disquieting in a democracy.'69 Citizens live with this ambiva-
lence knowing that the judiciary is at least indirectly accountable. Substantive
law can be changed through legislation or constitutional amendment. Even
where judges are not elected, the populace can indirectly affect the composi-
tion of judicial personnel by electing the officials who engage in the
selection. 70 In addition, where judges are subject to periodic direct or
retention election, the candidate can be rejected, although this is a rare
occurrence. 171
In the end, it is difficult to support the view that judges, even in an elective
state system, are representative in nature. In our, view, it hardly provides a
secure basis to label all judges "representatives" and then insist that they
mirror the composition of the public as a whole. It is entirely appropriate and
necessary in a democracy that citizens demand that the executive and
legislative branches of government represent them. Such representation by
judges, however, is antithetical to the classical model that requires them
dispassionately to apply the law to individual cases. At the very least, one can
aspire to the classical model of the judiciary, while recognizing that the
diverse methods of selection and the human nature of judges once in office
hinder its realization.
166. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY (1980); Elliot E. Slotnick, Review Essay on Judicial Recruitment and Selection, 13
JUST. SYS. J. 109 (1988).
167. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990); see also id. Canon
3(B)(9) (imposing similar limitations on public comments by non-candidate judges regarding issues
which might affect matters pending before the court); Brian L. McDermott, The Constitutionality of
Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Free Speech Rights of Judges, 25 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 855 (1992) (discussing the pre-1990 version of the rule).
168. See DUBOiS, supra note 166; Lawrence Baum, The Electoral Fates of Incumbent Judges in the
Ohio Court of Common Pleas, 66 JUDICATURE 420 (1982); Maura Anne Schoshinski, Note, Towards
an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 839 (1994). More recent works suggest that judicial races may have a higher salience
for voters than is generally believed. See, e.g., Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial
Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300 (1992); Nicholas P. Lovrich et
al., Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 28 (1989).
169. See Louis M. Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1571 (1988).
170. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577 (1993).
171. Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional
Rights, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 136 (1989); cf Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention
Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306 (1994).
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Some have argued that creating "safe" districts for racial minorities under
the Voting Rights Act will lead to an unhealthy "balkanization" of American
politics, since it discourages candidates from appealing to all groups for
electoral support. 72 A similar balkanization is apparent if we allow judges
to become subject to political, racial, or gender capture.' Making judicial
selection subject to de facto quotas will undermine the independence of the
judiciary, an ideal worth preserving. At the very least, the public expectation
of a fair and impartial judiciary will be devalued if it is widely known or
accepted that a particular jurist is an "African-American," "white," "Catholic,"
or "female" judge, instead of just a "judge."'74
IV. THE LIMITS OF GENDER NEUTRAL JUDGING
AND JUDICIAL SELECTION
Thus far, this Article has argued that, on the whole, there is little empirical
evidence to suggest that female judges decide cases in a fundamentally
different manner than their male counterparts, and accordingly, there is little
172. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2598-99 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); Shaw v.
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993); ef Lani Guinier, [Elrasing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases,
108 HARV. L. REv. 109, 132-37 (1994) (arguing that the current systems of"winner take all" districting
leads to balkanization as well); Lani Guinier, Don't Scapegoat the Gerrymander, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 36 (making a similar argument). See generally Peter Applebome, Fitting
Designer Districts into Off-the-Rack Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at E4.
173. The notion that judges should not simply serve narrow constituencies is underscored by the fact
that in virtually all states that elect judges, the jurisdiction of the judge's court is coterminous with the
electoral basis of the court. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999
F.2d 831, 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994). Thus, we view with
dismay proposals to insure election of minority judges by carving up electoral districts out of a larger
jurisdictional base. See, e.g., Slabach, supra note 163, at 869-71. Whatever efficacy this may have for
other branches of govemment, see LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 149 (1994) (advocating remedies other than redistricting,
such as cumulative voting, to increase the political power of electorally disadvantaged groups), it is
particularly inappropriate for judges. See Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1544-45 (1Ith Cir. 1994) (en
banc); Pasquale A. Cipollone, Comment, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and Judicial Elections:
Application andRemedy, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 733, 759-63 (1991). Such a districting plan is now in effect
in the Hamilton County Municipal Court in Cincinnati, Ohio. See Mallory v. Eyrich, 707 F. Supp. 947
(S.D. Ohio 1989) (consent decree settling Voting Rights Act litigation).
Whether state judges are appointed or elected, drawing them from a statewide cadre is not necessary
or practical. (Even in the federal system, where that literally occurs for Article III judges, most judges
are from the geographic area of the court to which they are appointed.) Some geographic grounding for
state judicial selection is thus appropriate. But the best balance of the sometimes conflicting goals of
judicial accountability and independence is to make judicial jurisdictions coterminous with the populace
that elects them.
174. The approach taken by this Article is consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of a similar,
ostensibly impartial adjunct to the court, the jury. In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., the Court held that
the gender-based use of peremptory challenges was subject to heightened scrutiny, and since it was
premised largely on stereotypes of how men and women jurors voted, it violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). We do not understand the Court to call for affirmative action quotas
to ensure proportionate representation on all juries. Rather, the Court simply held that the selection
procedures for juries should be free of gender discrimination. See Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women s
Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1115 (1994). Likewise,
this Article calls for gender-neutral selection ofjudges, see infra part IV, but it is inappropriate to insist
that a certain percentage of judges be women.
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cause to select more women judges simply because of their gender. This
position might inspire accusations that we hold a highly idealized and wholly
unrealistic view of judicial decision-making and judicial selection. This Part,
however, both defends our idealism and acknowledges the harsh realities that
deflate our hopes.
It appears to be common ground among many observers that judicial
decision-making is partly or wholly "political" (invaded by the judge's
partisan, moral, or personal policy views) notwithstanding what the "law"
appears to require. Legal Realists and their intellectual successors in this
century have long advanced this view. 7 Among political scientists, the
classical model described above is the Legal Method; the view that nonlegal
reasons influence judges is the Attitudinal Model. 76 Researchers have
generated considerable evidence in support of the latter model, principally by
correlating background attributes of judges (e.g., their political party) with
their voting behavior (e.g., operationalizing decisions as either liberal or
conservative). 77
Still, we do not wish to misrepresent the views of the critics of classical
judging. Undoubtedly, their views are more nuanced than our brief summary
indicates. These realist critics argue both that a model of judging based on
pure deductive reasoning from precedent or other legal materials neither
describes as a positive matter what most judges do, nor is necessarily
desirable in order to reach fair and just results in individual cases. Instead,
they see the tradition of common law as imposing both restraints (stare
decisis) and providing leeway (emphasizing different facts or the social or
economic context of individual cases) within which judges may operate. These
traditions supply a determinate quality to the law that -most realists can
appreciate. 
7 1
Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that the empirical support for the
Attitudinal Model is not as one-sided as some may think. 79 It is difficult
to disentangle and measure legal and nonlegal rationales. A "liberal" decision
by a "Democratic" judge may be the result of a correct application of
precedent.'80 Moreover, there are powerful constraints imposed by our legal
culture on a truly result-oriented judge. Typically, judges justify their
175. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 19-28; Heidi L. Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 1187 (1994).
176. For a forceful restatement of the latter model, together with a compilation of social science
support, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL
MODEL (1993).
177. See, e.g., C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time Building and Theory Building in Personal
Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-1988, 35 AM. J. POL. Scd. 460 (1991).
178. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 6, at 124-57; Paul Gewirtz, Editor's Introduction to KARL
LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA at xv-xxiii (rev. ed. 1989). Those scholars within
the Critical Legal Studies movement may prove to be an exception.
179. See Symposium, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 4 LAW & COURTS 3 (Law and
Courts Section, Am. Pol. Science Ass'n, Washington D.C.), Spring 1994, at 3-9 (reprinting critical
commentary on SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 176); Gregory A. Caldeira, Book Review, 88 AM. POL.
Scl. REv. 485 (1994) (reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 176).
180. See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323 (1992).
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decisions orally or in writing through ostensibly principled rationales. Judges
are usually subject to reversal by higher courts) 8. ' In addition, judges may
be subject to removal if they fail to follow what legal convention demands.
Still, as realists we do not dispute that, consciously or not, "political"
factors play a role, perhaps sometimes a large role, in the daily lives of trial
and appellate judges. Female jurists are surely not any more or less immune
to these influences than male judges. It is likely that most judges usually
employ some version of what is called pragmatic or practical reasoning.'82
That is, depending on the circumstances, most judges employ an eclectic mix
of interpretative styles (i.e., plain meaning, legislative intent and purpose,
public policy, etc.) to reach what appears to be the correct and sound result
within the confines of the precedent or positive law at issue. This reasoning
may or may not be reflected in the formal logic of the judge's decision
justifying a result. Regardless of the label one may apply to this process, it
is not totally divorced from the classical model of judging. Therefore, that
model remains a useful device against which to measure the aspirations of
feminist judging.
We are likewise not oblivious to the realities of judicial selection. In those
states that elect or appoint judges, the office may be viewed as a partisan
spoil similar to any other.' 83 Merit systems presumably filter out at least
some of the politics. At the federal level, it has long been recognized that
patronage and partisan factors play a role alongside merit-a large percentage
of all Presidential appointees for Article III judgeships have traditionally been
members of the appointing President's own political party. 84 But, it is not
foolishly optimistic to contend that politics are not completely controlling in
this area, either. In federal judicial appointments, politics and patronage play
a role. As measured by the ratings of the American Bar Association, however,
many or most of these appointments have some degree of merit, in that the
nominees are considered to be at least "qualified."'185 Relatedly, Stephen
Carter'86 and Carl Tobias 8 7 are correct in noting that the federal judicial
selection process can be made more merit-based and less politicized. There
181. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541-42 (4th ed. 1992).
182. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 455; Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and
Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 23-34
(1993); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26, 33-36 (1994) (noting that the decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices are usually explainable as a combination of the force of precedent,
the substantive policy preferences of the Justices, and the Justices' perceptions of institutional
competence).
183. Cf Michael E. Solimine, Constitutional Restrictions of the Partisan Appointment ofFederal and
State Judges, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 955 (1993).
184. See Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying On a Tradition, 74
JUDICATURE 294 (1991).
185. Sheldon Goldman, Federal Judicial Recruitment, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT, supra note 58, at 189, 202-03.
186. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS 147-55 (1994).
187. Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257, 1274-86.
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is no reason why similar reforms cannot be undertaken at the state level,
principally by adopting some version of merit selection.
In an ideal world of judicial selection, women would presumably be
randomly scattered in any particular field of candidates, and the composition
of the judicial candidate pool would reflect the number of female lawyers in
the population (about one-fifth of the total).' 8 Given that women, now
constitute over one-third of bar admissions,'8 9 one would "expect women to
make up 40% of the lawyer population in the second decade of the 21st
century."' 90 The intuitive appeal of proportionality' 9' perhaps explains
why Justice O'Connor 92 and others193 have suggested a goal of approxi-
mately one-half of all judges being women.' 94
Alas, the ideal world cannot yet be realized, given the minuscule number
of female judges currently serving. 9 There is considerable evidence that
women have been excluded from serious consideration for judgeships in the
past. 196 This exclusion appears to be waning, but appropriate steps must still
be taken to insure that women are part of the pool of lawyers considered for
any given judgeship.'97
In the final analysis, the notion that there should be more women on the
bench is based on an intuitive sense of fairness. At the root of the problem is
the basic question of whether men and women are different. Empirical studies
have not and probably cannot definitively determine whether there are
differences based on gender in how men and women handle cases. Instinct
and experience suggest that in all likelihood, there is not a meaningful
difference. Nevertheless, the debate over whether men and women are
different, and whether those differences have some role to play on the bench,
seems unresolvable. This justifies to some extent the call for placing, and
electing, more women to the bench. If there is a cognitive or psychological
188. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 841-44; BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON,
AMERICAN BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE
1990s 3-4 (1994).
189. CURRAN & CARSON, supra note 188, at 3.
190. Id. at 4.
191. See Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2597 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
192. O'Connor, supra note 106, at 1549.
193. E.g., Cedarbaum, supra note Ill, at 43.
194. Since we are critical of the concept of female judges as representatives, see supra part III.C.,
a more proper goal would be for the gender composition ofjudges to match that of the pool from which
almost all judges are drawn.
195. See supra note 1. Note that even these small numbers-about 10% of the federal courts of
appeals and state supreme courts-are about one-half of the current percentage of female attorneys. This
difference is not staggering when one considers that most female lawyers are younger and have not yet
entered the pool of candidates to be considered for judgeships. See CURRAN & CARSON, supra note 188,
at 6.
196. CYNTHIA F. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 237-46 (2d ed. 1993); PERRY, supra note 151, at 118-20.
197. See Nicholas 0. Alozie, Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The Effects of Judicial
Selection Methods, 71 Soc. ScI. Q. 315, 318 (1990) (noting that in a study of state systems, different
methods of judicial selection do not significantly explain the presence or absence of women judges, but
the percentage of women lawyers do).
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difference in how men and women perceive the world,'98 those differing
perceptions should be present on the courts.
The process of managing and deciding a case rests heavily on perception,
language, stereotypes and first impressions. The conscious and unconscious
strictures on judicial thinking, which might to some degree be gender-based,
should be as diverse as possible. This is not to say that men and women will
decide cases differently (the evidence so far indicates that they do not). It is
to say that a broad mix of perceptions, assumptions and stereotypes which
judges necessarily use in handling all the matters involved in their cases-
large and small-will lead more often to decisions "that are legally defensible
or in some sense 'right." ' 199
Likewise, we are sympathetic to the educative and consciousness-raising
functions that women judges can serve." 0 In this context, judges can be role
models, not as recipients of special treatment, but as positive symbols of
women with influence in the realm of law.20 ' Those goals can best be
realized, however, when the judicial selection process considers candidates as
individuals, rather than imposing quotas and insisting that a fixed number of
judges be of one gender.
CONCLUSION
The empirical and normative implications of the recent call for more female
jurists have largely escaped critique. This Article has sought to fill that gap.
We, too, agree that there should be more female judges, but our reasons are
more restrained than those of most advocates. The weight of the evidence
demonstrates that most female judges do not decide cases in a distinctively
feminist or feminine manner. This is fortunate, since there is a serious
problem with blithely calling judges "representative," and then claiming that
judges for that reason alone should reflect the gender composition of the
population. We do acknowledge, however, that there remains the critical issue
of whether men and women bring different perspectives to bear in their roles
as judges. Given the unsettled nature of this question, intuitive fairness
justifies a goal of electing and appointing more women to the bench. We do
not favor quotas, however. Rather, judicial selection procedures which
broaden the perspective of who is qualified to be a judge ultimately will
insure that more women become judges.
Shortly after her Supreme Court appointment, Justice Ginsburg remarked
that she was in favor of a "diverse judiciary," but was against "anything like
proportional representation. '2 2 She added that she looked forward to the
198. See GILLIGAN, supra note 14; JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE (1994).
199. Bartlett, supra note 11, at 867; see also POSNER, supra note 6, at 412 n.33 ("The case for
judicial awareness of the multiple perspectives in which it is possible to examine legal claims ...
supplies an argument for a diverse judiciary.").
200. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
201. See BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 274-76 (discussing affirmative action in the context of gender).
202. Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Second Woman Justice, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 40, 41.
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day when it would be regarded as "natural '20 3 for women to act as judges.
We agree with Justice Ginsburg that the proper evolution of judicial selection
and judging is one that is free of gender bias, rather than one that accentuates
it.
203. Id.
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